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The Making of a ‘Colony’ in Karachi and
the Politics of Regularisation
Haris Gazdar and Hussain Bux Mallah
1 While informality, particularly with respect to housing and land use, has a persuasive
case as an epistemology for, rather than an aberration of, urban planning (Roy 2005),
demand-making by unplanned settlements and not only by their individual inhabitants
may have a similar claim with respect to urban political processes (Peattie & Aldrete-Haas
1981).  Everyday struggles and mundane daily practices of migrants and others at the
urban margin, for economic and social survival, encompass myriad forms and instances
of collective action which have the potential to become movements (Bayat 1997, 2000).
Bayat (2000) argues that the quiet spatial encroachment by the marginal and the migrant
through informality is  not  only redistributive but  can also add up to transformative
politics  because of  the presence of  moral  elements  alongside rational  calculation for
individual advantage. He is hopeful that the emergence of forms of collective identity
beyond kinship and ethnicity may provide these moral ingredients.
2 This is close to the understanding of a social movement theorist such as Polletta (1999)
whose engagement with the concept of ‘free space’ attempts to clarify the position of
culture and norms in the operation of group identity in collective action. ‘Prefigurative’
free  spaces,  in  Polletta’s  (1999)  taxonomy  are  those  that  allow  the  forging  of  new
identities and interests, and are to be contrasted with ‘indigenous’ ones, which facilitate
collective action among subalterns through pre-existing institutional forms. The former
are more likely to be associated with transformative politics, while the latter are more
likely  to  sustain  and  succeed  in  attaining  their  immediate  goals.  It  is  not  ‘demand-
making’ as such, but it is its cultural context and normative content that matters.
3 In this paper we would like to ask if and how demand-making by unplanned settlements
shapes the urban political process in Karachi, and indeed national politics in Pakistan.
Karachi is no different from other major South Asian cities, or cities elsewhere in Asia,
Africa and Latin America with around half of the city’s population residing in localities
that started life as unplanned settlements or as settlements not formally planned by state
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authorities  or  their  legally  mandated  agents.  The  city  is  also  not  unique  in  having
experienced ongoing processes of regularisation of unplanned settlements, with complete
post hoc legalisation and titling as only the far end of the spectrum which include many
grades  of  tenure security  and civic  provision.  Roy’s  (2009)  incisive  critique of  urban
planning in India would be at home in Karachi, even if we do remain more willing than
her  to  use  the  formal/informal,  legal/illegal,  and planned/unplanned dichotomies  as
starting  categories.  We  are  interested  in  demand-making  by  or  on  the  behalf  of
unplanned,  informal,  and  illegal  settlements  which,  at  least  at  their  outset,  were
inhabited by non-propertied indigenous or migrants labourers and other marginalised
groups and individuals.1
4 While  there is  a  rich empirical  literature on informality  in housing and land use  in
Karachi, few if any of these studies sought out linkages with the urban political process
(Hasan 1998). The same holds true the other way. Karachi’s politics has attracted a great
deal of scholarly interest, particularly since the 1990s, much of which focused on
ethnicity and political  organisation with few attempts at exploring the interaction of
either with informality (Haq 1995). An emerging consensus among local observers that
political  and  ethnic  violence,  particularly  on  the  city’s  demographically  significant
geographic periphery, is closely connected with contests over land use, appears as an




5 Demand-making by or on behalf of unplanned settlements requires collective action. The
classical  rational  choice  framework  provides  a  rigorous  account  of  constraints  to
collective action in the form of free-riding individuals and sub-optimal investments in
public goods (Olson 1971). The strength of the Olsonian approach lies in its clarification of
the mechanical linkages between collective action, public goods and groups. Public goods
and  groups  are  co-defined,  and  without  any  necessity  to  ascribe  causation  or
chronological ordering. A public good is ‘any good such that if, any person in a group
consumes it, it cannot be feasibly withheld from others in that group’ (Olson 1971: 14).
Olson’s  original  model  and  rational  choice  modifications  to  it  suggest  a  number  of
empirical regularities. Voluntary, non-coercive collective action will be rarely observed
in  situations  where  contributions  to  the  production  of  the  public  good  cannot  be
individually  incentivised.  Within-group inequality  will  improve the chances  of  public
good production,  even if  it  inhibits the participation of most members in production
(Baland & Platteau 2007, Bardhan et al. 2007).
6 Olson’s (1971) approach was deliberately set in opposition to prevailing theories of the
group, which laid stress on the intrinsic value of group participation to individuals, and
focused attention on conditions where individual self-interest had to exclusively carry
the burden of the explanation of group behaviour. Later developments responding to the
empirical prevalence of group activity and collective action, in contrast to Olson’s (1971)
skepticism, expanded the rational choice framework to include considerations of norms,
leadership, as well as heterogeneity of individuals not only in terms of wealth but in
terms of  their motivations to contribute to public goods (Ostrom 2000).  Many of  the
conditions identified by Ostrom (2000) for the resolution of collective action constraints
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are comparable to perspectives offered in the theory of social movements (Polletta 1999,
Polletta & Jasper 2001).
7 The proliferation of unplanned settlements and the prevalence of on-going processes of
regularisation in the face of  formal  regulation must correspond with the ubiquity of
forms  and  instances  of  collective  action  in  the  city.  Regulation  refers  to  the
implementation  of  zoning  laws,  eviction  of  existing  unplanned  settlements  and  the
prevention of new unplanned settlements taking shape.  Regularisation is the post  hoc
legalisation  of  existing  unplanned  settlement  and  their  formal  incorporation  into
municipal  governance  and  service  delivery.  The  very  existence  of  an  unplanned
settlement in opposition to threats of eviction and legal action requires some individuals
to make inherently risky investments,  which will  produce public goods for all  group
members.  The public  good in question is  the steady improvement in the security  of
tenure  as  eviction  and  legal  threats  are  successfully  negotiated,  and  all  actual  and
potential residents will enjoy its benefits without the possibility of exclusion. The key
point here is  that  in general,  tenure security applies  by necessity to higher units  of
aggregation than individuals and families: if a settlement is insecure all residents within
it are insecure, and if it gains security of tenure all residents benefit. Returning to Olson
(1971), therefore, it is possible to frame the settlement as a group and tenure security as
its corresponding public good.
8 There are two reasons why we are interested in using the original Olson model as a point
of departure for interpreting narratives of the progressive regularisation of an unplanned
settlement in the central district of Karachi. First, Olson’s model in its barest form focuses
on the settlement as the group of reference, which is helpful if we want to understand the
implications  of  settlement  formation  and  consolidation  for  urban  political  process.
Second, we wish to examine if the aggregate effect of demand-making by and on behalf of
unplanned settlements  might  be  transformative  even if  all  of  the  myriad forms and
instances  of  collective  action  are  motivated  by  rational  self-interest  alone.  In  other
words,  are  there  possibilities  for  transformative  politics  if  Bayat’s  (2000)  ‘quiet
encroachment’  is  shorn of  moral  content,  and these atomised instances  of  collective
action do not visibly transcend into Polletta’s (1999) ‘prefigurative’ free spaces?
9 In Section 2 of  this  paper,  we provide an account of  the process of  attaining tenure
security in an unplanned settlement in the central district of Karachi spanning a period
from the 1960s to the present. The start of this period coincided with the rise of electoral
politics and the election to office of the populist Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP), following
14 years of military rule. This period also marked a turning point in an ongoing tussle in
urban  planning  between  regulation  and  regularisation  of  settlements.  The  PPP
government was overthrown in 1977 and replaced by another military regime which
lasted till the late 1980s, and in its twilight period in 1987, legislated for the regularisation
of unplanned settlements through the specially created Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority
(SKAA).
10 The late 1980s saw a major political  shift  with the emergence of  the Muhajir  Qaumi
Movement (MQM), a militant ethnic party championing the cause of Partition migrants,
which came to dominate electoral politics in the city.2 The MQM acquired a reputation for
armed force and was frequently in a state of conflict with other parties, ethnic groups and
state security forces throughout the 1990s. The party became a key player in the 2000s in
city  and  provincial  governments  when  it  was  rehabilitated  by  General  Musharraf’s
military  regime  following  a  period  when its  supporters  had  faced  a  crackdown and
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widespread human rights abuses. The MQM, which had shed its overt ethnic identity had
become vested in installing large-scale  urban infrastructure projects  such as  express
roads and flyovers. Towards the end of our period of interest military rule had ended and
the MQM had agreed to share power with the PPP.
11 In Section 3, we retrace Karachi’s political trends from the vantage point of unplanned
settlement regulation and regularisation and Section 4 concludes with observations about
the transformative potential of collective action in the demand-making by unplanned
settlements. 
 
The making of a ‘colony’
12 The  term katchi  abadi literally  means  impermanent  settlement.  While  proponents  of
regularisation refer to all unplanned settlements as katchi abadis, official policy has come
to reserve this term for those settlements that might be eligible for regularisation or ones
which  have  already  been  regularised.  Many  residents  of  regularised  unplanned
settlements, conversely, resent the use of the term katchi abadi for their neighbourhoods
because of its association with marginality. The English word ‘colony’ is a commonly used
term for unplanned settlements in the city—a usage which is mocked, as we show below,
by proponents of regulation.3
13 The Kausar Niazi Colony (KNC) is a settlement, which first appeared in the riverbed of a
natural storm drain known as Gujjar Nala in the early 1970s. It occupied land left aside by
the Karachi Development Authority (KDA), the premier planning body for the city, on the
fringes of the newly-established high-income locality of North Nazimabad. The KNC is
currently part of Union Council (UC) Hyderi of North Nazimabad Town. Besides the KNC
all other segments of this UC consist of planned parts of North Nazimabad.4 The KNC
accounts for 36% of Hyderi’s population and around 15% of its total area. The duality
between unplanned the KNC and the planned parts of Hyderi can be gauged from the
contrast in literacy rates, proportion of non-Muslims, and average household size (Table
1). While the rest of UC Hyderi is predominantly Urdu-speaking, the KNC is ethnically
heterogeneous with less than 5% of its  population estimated to be Muhajir,  with the
remainder belonging to different ethnic groups including Pashtuns, Punjabis, Seraikis,
Bengalis and Baloch.5
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of Kausar Niazi Colony and rest of UC Hyderi
 Kausar Niazi Colony (KNC) Rest of UC Hyderi
Population 21,059 37,323
Literacy rate % 50.2 83.9
Non-Muslims % 7.6 0.8
Average household size 7.6 6.0
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Population Census 1998
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14 The fieldwork on which we base our case study was conducted between March and May
2009 by a team of researchers including one of the authors (Mallah), another male
researcher and two women. The team was familiar with the KNC through prior fieldwork
in 2003, which had culminated in a social and physical mapping of the colony. The 2009
fieldwork refined the social map with a particular focus on the history of settlement and
regularisation  of  different  geographical  segments.  There  were  identifiable
neighbourhoods clustered around kinship group, ethnicity and religious affiliation, with
corresponding narratives of leadership, collective identity and marginality. This paper
draws upon four key informant interviews, ten group discussions (with men, women and
mixed  gender  groups)  and  five  individual  cases  relating  to  instances  of  residential
vulnerability. The choice of respondents was attentive to heterogeneity within the colony
between neighbourhoods and communities.
 
From Gujjar Nala to Kausar Niazi Colony
15 Zaman  Khan,  an  ethnic  Pashtun  from  a  tribal  area  of  northern  Pakistan,  was
acknowledged by most residents as the first person to settle in the area in the early 1960s.
Zaman had been a travelling salesman who dealt in imported fabric that was brought into
the country across the border from Afghanistan. Pashtun traders from both sides of the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border had found a niche in smuggling foreign goods that were
otherwise restricted or attracted import duties. Landless pastoralist migrants are among
the  more  marginalised  segments  of  tribal  Baloch  and  Afghan  societies,  but  their
customary  privilege  of  traversing  international  borders  and  making  seasonal  camp
outside city limits made them valuable partners in cross-border trade. Zaman set up his
fabric shops in the cover of the campsite of the seasonal migrants.
16 While  some of  Zaman’s  early  partners  among the seasonal  migrants  left,  others  had
remained behind and settled down in Karachi. Aslam Baloch claims to head a number of
Baloch families who came to the Gujjar Nala from various regions and kinship groups in
the early 1970s. Aslam says that he can command over four hundred votes at election
time, and is currently affiliated with the MQM. He was an office-bearer of the PPP in the
past, but developed differences with the party leadership some years ago. He along with
some  other  community  leaders  invited  PPP  provincial  minister  Jam  Sadiq  Ali  to  a
reception at the settlement during the early 1970s in a bid to gain political protection for
the settlement. This bid failed, and there was an attempt by municipal authorities to evict
the settlement in 1972.
17 Meanwhile,  Zaman had also made contacts  with PPP leaders and was approached by
federal  minister  Kausar  Niazi  to  join  the  party  and  become  its  office-bearer  in  the
emerging settlement. At the time the area was still  sparsely populated and the small
cluster  of  homes  around  Zaman’s  camp-market  had  more  potential  voters  that  the
surrounding planned areas. Kausar Niazi who was also a religious leader provided funds
for building a mosque, which was named after him. Zaman began lobbying with various
ministers and government officials for official recognition of the colony and the provision
of public utilities. Kausar Niazi himself visited the settlement and got Zaman and other
PPP members to initiate the registration of residents for national identity cards and in
voter lists. The address recorded in these official documents was Kausar Niazi Colony.
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Consolidation
18 While the colony kept expanding from the original cluster, with incremental additions of
infrastructure  at  different  times,  there  was  also  a  constant  struggle  with  municipal
authorities,  private developers,  and residents of  the neighbouring segments of  North
Nazimabad. The expansion was led by Zaman as well as rival Pashtun land agents such as
Rehmat Khan who had begun taking physical possession of areas of land, subdividing it
and selling off individual plots. Evictions were attempted or carried out in 1975, 1978 and
then again 1980 in which parts of the colony were demolished. All these attempts were
followed by the return of the residents and rebuilding of homes assisted and protected by
the land agents.
19 The general method followed by Zaman and other Pashtun land agents in the KNC was
not very different from what has been observed elsewhere in Karachi (Linden & Selier
1991). Initially, these land agents encouraged migrants to take possession of plots of land
that  they had themselves  marked out  for  free  or  for  nominal  amounts.  They would
facilitate the new occupants in building on these plots,  while retaining possession of
other plots in the same segment. The land agents maintained links with political parties
as well as government officials—the former on the promise of political support and the
latter in return for monetary reward. They used these links to help the residents of the
plots they sold to resist attempts by municipal authorities to eviction encroachments.
20 Intimidation was a constant theme in the actions of land agents, particularly in the early
phase of consolidation. If  transactional relations with police and government officials
broke down, or perhaps to underpin those relations, the threat of armed violence was
ever-present.  Zaman and  other  Pashtun  land  agents  had  family  connections  in  self-
governed  tribal  areas  with  easy  access  to  firearms  and  places  of  refuge  from  state
authorities, and these factors were weighed up by those who dealt with them. The violent
reputation of the Pashtun land agents was periodically reinforced when they pursued
mutual vendettas and engaged in deadly clashes with one another. 
21 The relationship between the Pashtun land agents and other residents whom they both
encouraged and dominated cannot be understood properly without reference to social
marginality. The migrants initially mobilised or encouraged by Zaman and his peers were
without exception from castes, tribes, kinship groups and religious minorities living on
the margins of rural communities across the country and beyond. The land agents while
poor  to  begin  with  were  not  socially  marginal  in  the  sense  that  they  faced  active
oppression and discrimination in their  areas  of  origin or  elsewhere.  If  anything,  the
political and administrative marginality of their home regions added to their reputation
for violence, which augmented their power in the KNC and in the city generally.
22 We recorded many instances where the asymmetric social position and political power of
the Pashtun land agents and their clients had been deployed to the disadvantage of the
latter. These abuses of asymmetric power, however, were a small part of the relationship,
which  was  otherwise  based  on  mutual  dependence,  at  least  in  the  initial  period  of
consolidation. The Pashtun land agents who saw economic opportunities in the informal
housing market needed the socially marginalised migrants just as much as the latter
needed them.  In order  to  establish a  settlement  it  was  necessary to  situate  not  just
individual  men,  but  a  number  of  families  who  would  set  up  home,  no  matter  how
precarious the situation. According to the young son of a murdered Pashtun land agent
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Rehmat  Khan  ‘we  are  people  with  honour  and  will  never  bring  our  families  and
womenfolk to live in a settlement that has not been regularised.’ He was contrasting his
family’s honour code with the less restrained outlook of his clients, but also with that of
his rival Zaman whose own family did reside in the KNC from the outset. It was another
matter  than Zaman had contracted several  marriages  with  women from the  various
socially marginalised groups who had come to settle in the KNC, as part of his strategy to
expand and consolidate the settlement.
23 The significance of women in resisting eviction was highlighted by the experience of a
group of families belonging to the Odh community.6 They had arrived in the KNC in the
1970s after having been evicted from another unplanned settlement at the site of a public
park a few kilometres away. Just as Pashtun men act as effective land agents due to their
reputed ability to inflict and withstand violence, residents of the KNC acknowledge the
strength of Odh women and grudgingly admit that police and land agents are scared of
them. Police officers who were sent to forcibly evict them from the site of the public park
ended up negotiating a voluntary departure in lieu of alternate land in the KNC. The Odh
segment of the KNC was established without the direct involvement of the Pashtun land
agents,  and the fierce reputation of  Odh women was a  factor  in the Odhs acquiring
autonomy.
24 Another group of migrants from a marginalised group are led by Mirza, a middle-aged
transport worker whose father arrived in Karachi in the 1960s from a village called Lawa
in the Potohar plateau of northern Punjab. Mirza’s family belongs to the Muslim Shaikh
caste,  which  is  pejoratively  called  Mussalli,  and  who  work  predominantly  as  farm
labourers or brick kiln workers, often under conditions of debt bondage. ‘Our family used
to live and work as servants of landlords in their fields, homes and animal sheds. There is
no freedom under the shadow of the landlords’ says Mirza. His father was among the first
from the Muslim Shaikhs of Lawa to have arrived in Karachi. He bought a vacant plot
from a Pashtun land agent and then encouraged his relatives and other Muslim Shaikhs
from Lawa to also migrate to Karachi. Over time they began to insist on being known as
the Lawa community instead of the caste identifier Muslim Shaikh, which they and others
associate with low status. Mirza is now acknowledged as a leader of the Lawa who number
over 50 families in the KNC.
 
Milestones
25 There were several important milestones that were achieved by the colony through self-
organisation, since the 1960s. Some of its segments got electricity connections in 1972
through the link between Zaman and Minister Kausar Niazi. The overthrow of the PPP
government in 1977 and Kausar Niazi’s fall from power temporarily stalled but did not
reverse  the  consolidation  of  the  KNC.  Older  residents  report  that  they  had  started
constructing cement and concrete structures in place of mud and thatch huts in the early
1980s.  Although  Zaman  continued  to  play  an  important  part  in  regulating  land
occupation and transactions, other lobbyists and land agents also emerged. Some of them
were men from marginalised groups who became recognised as leaders of their kinship
groups within the KNC. These individuals almost always had links with political parties
also. The military government that had replaced the PPP presented itself as pro-Islamist
and  members  of  the  Jamaat-i-Islami  were  active  in  the  KNC.  A  move  to  get  gas
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connections in the early 1980s was attentive to this change of political mood. Successful
applicants of gas connections recorded the address of their locality as Islamia Colony.
26 There was an eager response in the KNC to the establishment of the SKAA in 1987. A
number of men including Zaman, rival land agents such as Rehmat Khan, local kinship
group  leaders  such  as  Aslam  Baloch,  Mirza,  and  party  activists  were  involved  in
mobilising residents to make joint applications for regularisation. Zaman established a
local welfare association and set up a small office for it in one of his properties. While
formally it was this organisation that lobbied with the SKAA, Zaman and other leaders
also made frequent appeals for funds from the residents on the plea that they needed to
pay bribes to concerned officials. Past successes such as the recording of local addresses
in identity cards and evidence of public utility connections such as electricity and gas
were factors which became relevant as proof that the settlement had existed before the
amnesty date. In 1988, one segment of the KNC was regularised in the sense that the SKAA
recognised its eligibility for the leasing of individual plots. Water and sewerage lines were
laid in the early 1990s. A segment where earlier gas connections had been obtained in the
name of Islamia Colony was renamed Shahnawaz Bhutto Colony when registering with
the water and sewerage public utility. The PPP was back in office and its local activists
who played a role in getting water and sewerage services also sought to reclaim the
identity of the colony by naming it after a member of their leader’s family. A 1995 study
confirms that most houses had been connected to sewage lines–half of them through a
government scheme and the remainder on a self-help basis (Orangi Pilot Project-Research
and Training Institute 2002). The last official survey was carried out in 1997 when nearly
all of the area currently occupied by the KNC was notified for regularisation.
27 It was not only the KNC, however, that was expanding out and increasing its occupation
of vacant land by the Gujjar Nala. In the 1980s, the KDA decided to include a strip of land
beyond  the  original  plan  of  North  Nazimabad,  and  developed  large  residential  and
commercial plots. With the expansion of the KNC and the establishment of this extension
known as R-category the planned and unplanned settlements now share boundary walls.7
R-category owners complained that the KNC was responsible for lowering the value of
their properties, and that its residents were involved in crimes and immoral activities.
The upwardly mobile among KNC families resented what they regarded as R-category
haughtiness.  Matters  had escalated to a  point  where householders  in one part  of  R-
category had got together and blocked access streets going through their neighbourhood
from the KNC to the main road, forcing the latter to take a longer and more circuitous
route.
28 With the successful negotiation of the regularisation process with the SKAA most of the
claimants of ownership in the KNC enjoy a high degree of security in their property
rights, and have invested considerable savings into house construction. This is despite the
fact that many of them have not yet leased their individual plots. Some cite expense while
others say that a lease issued by the SKAA will not add to their sense of security. Although
there is a price premium on plots that have acquired the SKAA leases, the fact that it is
the SKAA and not the original municipal landowner which is a legal stakeholder creates a
justifiable sense of protection among the owners of non-leased plots.
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Spectre of eviction
29 The spectre of eviction threats,  however, is not altogether absent from the colony. A
current threat concerns KNC residents whose homes are on the embankments of the
drain which are not within the SKAA authorised map. In 2009, residents were informed
that land spanning 100 feet on either side of the Gujjar Nala will be acquired for the
construction of a transport corridor along the drain. This land includes not only several
houses that are outside of the SKAA map, but also some that are within the regularised
area.  While  homeowners  outside  the  SKAA  map  fear  uncompensated  eviction,  those
within the regularised part of the settlement expect to be compensated with cash and
alternative land allotment. The threat of eviction is seen to be credible in the light of the
experience of the Lyari Expressway a few years ago, which led to the displacement of
several thousand homes by the city municipal government. 
30 There is also a large group of families who now rent homes from KNC owners because
they were evicted from a nearby unplanned settlement they call Jhuggiyan Hyderi (JH) in
2005. The JH was a settlement with over 500 families, a mix of huts and cement houses,
electricity connections, local shops, and public buildings such as community mosques.
The settlement was thought to be on a public amenity plot and was in a perpetual state of
struggle with property owners and residents of neighbouring planned segments of North
Nazimabad who complained about  the  JH lowering  property  values,  sheltering  petty
crime,  and  encouraging  immorality.  Most  of  the  JH  residents  were  Seraiki-speaking
migrants  and  their  descendants  from  southern  districts  of  Punjab  belonging  to
marginalised service castes.
31 A common account of the events leading up to the eviction links the action closely with
electoral politics. The JH residents had begun lobbying an office-bearer of a faction of the
Pakistan Muslim League (PML) who had close links with some ethnic Seraikis. In 2005,
many  JH families  decided  to  support  PML candidates  in  local  government  elections,
marking  them  out  as  potential  opponents  for  the  MQM,  which  then  controlled  the
municipal  government and won the election.  According to  former JH residents  their
‘wrong’  political  choice provided their neighbours in the planned settlement with an
opportunity to successfully lobby the MQM for pushing ahead with the eviction.
 
Discussion
32 Olson’s (1971) collective action framework is a useful point of departure for interpreting
narratives of the KNC’s journey towards a relatively secure tenure. Secure tenure in the
face of planning regulation was, indeed, a public good from which individual residents
could not be excluded. Homeowners were in no hurry to acquire individual leases from
the SKAA once their segment of the settlement was officially notified for regularisation.
The production of this public good had entailed a great deal of individual contribution
over the decades in the form of risky investments vulnerable to demolition, willingness to
face legal  sanction,  and time and money spent lobbying political  leaders and bribing
officials.
33 Olson (1971) was pessimistic about the feasibility of voluntary, non-coercive collective
action in situations where individual compliance could not be sanctioned or rewarded,
and his pessimism is not entirely belied by the successful instances of collective action in
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the KNC. We see, in the Pashtun land agents, the ability to use coercive means. Moreover,
Olson’s prediction concerning within-group inequality is amply supported. Land agents
were willing to invest in producing the public good because they stood to make large
gains from it. Their control over numerous plots of land, which they could sell at a price
premium as the colony became more secure, made them willing investors to the benefit
of other residents. The inequality between group members was not economic to begin
with, but related to social status and political power. A settlement with greater within-
group equality, say JH, was unable to find sufficient investment in the production of the
public good to prevent eviction or to negotiate compensation. 
34 Moving on from Olson we also find sub-groups and leaders mediating between the main
group (the entire settlement) and individuals. In line with post-Olson rational choice as
well  as  social  movement  theory,  we  find  much  use  for  concepts  such  as  individual
heterogeneity, norms, culture, kinship groups, and indigenous free spaces. Sub-groups
such as Baloch seasonal migrants, Odh, and Lawa Muslim Shaikh play important parts in
the regularisation narratives. At first sight, these appear to be primordial kinship groups
which used their prior organisation to some advantage. On closer examination, however,
the picture is more complex. KNC Baloch, for example, are from disparate kinship groups
who gained a collective identity largely as a result of their experience of migration and
residence at the KNC. The Lawa, likewise, acquired a new identity in the KNC and actively
shed their association with their Muslim Shaikh roots in the home village. Moreover,
these and other sub-groups from marginalised rural communities had produced leaders
through engagement  with  the  process  of  regularisation  many  of  whom had  become
activists of political parties.
35 There were free spaces,  apparently of  the ‘indigenous’  type,  in the struggle between
regulation and regularisation in the KNC. The widespread acceptance of informal norms
and existing institutional forms on both sides of the regulation-regularisation divide was
in evidence at different points in the story. The first challenge to the dominant urban
planning idiom was the cultural acceptance of campsites of seasonal migrants on city
limits.  The knowledge that  the presence of  women and children raised political  and
perhaps moral costs of forced eviction to the authorities was also used to good effect by
KNC residents. The status hierarchy ingrained in the use of women implies that existing
structures  of  patriarchy  ought  to  be  counted  among  the  free  spaces  used  to  resist
regulation.  It  was  families  from rural  marginalised communities  whose  women were
available for physical resistance, with seclusion being seen as a marker of high status.
Reputations, such as those of Pashtun men and Odh women too, were part of discursive
free spaces.
 
Regulation, regularisation and political process
36 Urban planning in Karachi focused on the development of government owned land on the
city’s periphery and its allotment at prices estimated at a quarter of the market value
(Dowall 1991). The KDA, which was the prime supplier of land allocated under a tenth of
the area it developed to designated low-income housing (Arsalan et al. 2005), and the gap
between  allotment  and  market  prices  suggest  that  demand  far  exceeded  supply.
Partition-related refugee influx had created a large number of makeshift camps which
morphed into settlements. There were also pre-Partition settlements, notably the old city
quarter of Lyari, which neither enjoyed legal title nor access to civic amenities. The main
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response to the presence of unplanned settlements came during Pakistan’s first period of
military rule in the 1960s, when many Partition refugees residing in the city centre were
relocated to planned settlements on the city’s outskirts.
37 The first collective attempt at resisting regulation was staged in the old quarter of Lyari
whose residents became aware of plans to raze their locality and to shift them too away
from the city. Unlike the relatively recent Partition refugees, Lyari residents of several
decades launched a campaign to save their neighbourhood. They succeeded in drawing
the attention of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a civilian minister in Ayub Khan’s military regime,
who lobbied within government for  the regularisation of  the existing settlement.  He
rallied supporters at a public meeting in Lyari in 1963 where he announced that lease
documents will be issued to the residents.
38 Subsequently,  Lyari  became  a  support  base  for  Bhutto’s  PPP  which  contested  the
country’s first general elections held in 1970 on a populist platform. The PPP formed the
government in 1972 and the inaugural meeting of its provincial cabinet was held in 1972
at a public park in Lyari. An early action of the government was to instruct municipal
authorities to issue land titles to Lyari residents. The link between electoral politics and
demand-making  by  unplanned  settlements  was  established  and  the  regularisation  of
unplanned settlements was incorporated into the 1974 master-plan for Karachi (Hasan et
al. 1999).
39 The fall of the PPP government in 1977 and the re-imposition of military rule did not lead
to a reversal of the regularisation policy. In fact, the incoming military regime, mindful of
its tenuous support base, made further announcements, such as one by the President in
January  1978,  promising  the  regularisation  of  unplanned  settlements.8 The  main
watershed was the Sindh Katchi Abadi Act of 1987 that provided a comprehensive legal
and administrative framework for the process of regularisation. By 2005, the SKAA had
identified 539 unplanned settlements of which 483 qualified for regularisation and 379
(including the KNC) had been formally regularised.9
40 The rise of the MQM in the 1980s was premised on its rhetoric of Muhajirs being a middle
and lower class community, obscured differences in wealth and status, and allowed it to
build support bases in planned and unplanned areas alike.  Although most of  the top
leaders were residents of middle-income planned areas, many of them had links with
unplanned  settlements  where  their  families  had  lived  after  first  arriving  in  Karachi
(Budhani et al. 2010). The MQM’s early demands were entirely couched in opposition to
those it regarded as ethnic outsiders in Sindh, and did not include any reference to the
actual  living  conditions  of  its  own constituents.10 In  some  instances,  these  demands
translated into turf battles between party cadre and non-Muhajir residents of unplanned
residents,  while  in other places  there were attempts by MQM supporters  in planned
settlements to curb the expansion of new unplanned settlements which were populated
by more recent non-Muhajir migrants from within or outside the country (Collective for
Social Science Research 2005, Budhani et al. 2010).
41 Following the abandonment of its overt ethnic label in 1997, the MQM cultivated its image
as a party that would deliver effective urban development and governance (Baig 2005,
Khan 2007, 2008). It enjoyed control over municipal matters for much of the 2000s when
the  party’s  position  towards  unplanned  settlements  further  hardened  in  favour  of
regulation. Although ethnic rhetoric had been replaced by a stress on civic management,
non-Muhajir migrants and residents of unplanned settlements suspected ethnic motives
The Making of a ‘Colony’ in Karachi and the Politics of Regularisation
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 5 | 2011
11
at play. The Lyari Expressway (LEW), which was built between 2002 and 2009,11 led to the
eviction of between 30,000 to 77,000 homes along the Lyari riverbed.12 Extracts from the
resettlement project’s official website are cited at length as illustrative of the project, and
by close association, the MQM’s attitude towards unplanned settlements:
The fast growth of the city has, over the years, attracted numerous people from
within as well as outside the country […]. As this inflow of people continued over
the  years,  land  became  precious  and  even  the  Lyari  river  bed  became  prime
residential/commercial  property  as  it  was  right  in  the  heart  of  the  city.  The
unscrupulous elements caught unwary newcomers who were illegally given land
along the river at cheap prices where they ended up establishing residence. Slowly
but steadily the entire stretch of the river was encroached,  protruding into the
river bed and constricting the flow of water […]. Furthermore social problems also
began to creep up. Fundamentally, as the locality was on encroached land, drug
dealing, lawlessness and vice flourished. The haphazard construction of hutments
left no room for development of civic utilities or amenities […]. The problems were
innumerable but solutions limited to only one—resettlement at a properly planned
site in accordance with human rights conventions […].
[…] But this is just the beginning and the end is a distant reality. Along the way lie
many more ‘Colonies’,  many more families  that  remain embedded in a  maze of
narrow,  crooked  lanes  overflowing  with  sewage,  entangled  in  a  web  of  illegal
electricity connections, with streets without names and houses without numbers.
(Lyari Expressway Resettlement Project website, http://lerpkarachi.com.pk/pages/
index.php, last accessed 13 November 2011)
42 The LEW was the largest but not the only ‘mega-project’ that resulted in evictions. A city
strategic plan prepared by the municipal government in 2007 further raised fear among
residents of unplanned peri-urban settlements when it declared the city’s outskirts as
vacant land ready for development. The MQM whose early claims of representing the
poor were premised in large part  on its  support  base among Muhajirs  of  unplanned
settlements now looked like a protector of incumbents. In the KNC, the MQM was accused
of siding with R-category property owners. Although residents of unplanned settlements
along the Gujjar Nala are unlikely to have seen the analysis of their neighbourhoods on
the LEW website, they will have been familiar with the mocking and libellous tone of its
message through their dealings with neighbours in the R-category, or in the treatment
received by JH evictees. In the 2008 general elections, the MQM received a third of the
vote from the KNC compared to 50% for the PPP. In the rest of UC Hyderi, MQM’s vote
share was 85% compared to the PPP’s 12%.13 
43 What is of particular interest is that the KNC as well as other unplanned settlements had
emerged as pockets of opposition to the MQM in constituencies where the party was
always going to win the overall electoral contest. Local sub-group leaders had emerged as
interlocutors with political parties, whose more senior leaders valued a presence in the
locality. This happened precisely at a time when the party seemed most powerful with an
enhanced reputation for armed force, the backing of a military regime, and control of all
levers of government in the city. It was as though the KNC and settlements like it had
themselves become free spaces in the heartland of what seemed then like a hegemonic
organisation.
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Conclusion
44 We  believe  that  the  myriad  forms  and  instances  of  collective  action  that  lead  the
establishment of an unplanned settlement and its fitful journey towards regularisation
may add up to transformative political possibilities even if all of the particular instances
of collective action are driven exclusively by rational self-interest.
45 While we agree with Roy (2009) that there need not be any correspondence between
informality and poverty, we find that powerful beneficiaries of informality are destined
to take much shorter and less fitful journeys towards legalisation and formal protection
of property right. The social marginality of the people involved insures that they will put
up with long periods of vulnerability to eviction as a price for an eventual improvement
in tenure security. Within-group inequality and the utilisation of indigenous free spaces
such as the use of women’s bodies to protect a settlement, generate the potential for
successful  collective  action.  The  seemingly  unending  reserves  of  social  inequality  in
South Asia, often from outside the urban context, can thus fuel urban collective action
almost indefinitely.
46 Under these conditions, we would argue that collective action driven for rational self-
interest,  even shorn of further moral  content is  no mean achievement.  In fact,  what
appears  to  be  indigenous  free  spaces  such  as  ethnic  or  kinship  group  identity,  and
patriarchal sub-group leadership, may on closer examination turn out to be innovative
adaptations to urban possibilities and challenges. But perhaps most importantly, while
collective  action  around  unplanned  settlements  may  not  transcend  into  social
movements, it can help to keep the door open for plural democratic politics. This is not
saying much, but given the range of challenges that emanate from determined opponents
of democracy in contemporary South Asia, it is not saying that little either.
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NOTES
1. While we accept Roy’s  (2009)  proposal  that informality is  integral  to the appropriation of
urban  spaces  by  the  rich  and  poor  alike,  the  fact  is  that  readily  identifiable  unplanned
settlements are much poorer than identifiable planned settlements. In the last population census
in Karachi, for example, the literacy rate in the former was 55% compared with 80% in the latter
(authors’ calculations based on the 1998 population census, Government of Pakistan 1999, 2000a,
2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2004). This does not necessarily contradict Roy (2009) since the visibility of
informality may itself be a function of the prior political power of those benefiting from it. We
return to this issue below.
2. The word Muhajir  invokes  migration in  the face  of  religious  persecution in  early  Muslim
history.  It  was  an  officially  sanctioned  term  in  the  post-Partition  period  and  used  as  a
classificatory category in independent Pakistan’s first population census in 1951.
3. The word ‘colony’ is also used in the names of planned settlements in Karachi (for example
Shah  Faisal  Colony).  In  unplanned  settlements  the  name  is  chosen  by  residents  before  it  is
adopted by the government.
4. A Union Council is the lowest unit of administration in the system of local government until
2011.
5. North  Nazimabad  town  is  in  former  District  Central  of  Karachi  which  had  the  highest
proportion of Urdu-speakers (74 %) in the country (Government of Pakistan 2000a). The KNC’s
ethnic composition was estimated by the authors based on key informant interviews.
6. The Odhs who are also known as Rangar, are traditionally associated with construction labour
and a peripatetic lifestyle.
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7. We were unable to discover the significance of the term ‘R-category’ but it was commonly used
to differentiate this extension from segments of North Nazimabad that were developed when the
locality was first established in the 1960s.
8. This announcement was later covered by Martial Law Orders (MLOs) 110 and 183 of 1978.
9. Authors’ calculations based on the SKAA (various).
10. This observation is based on a reading of the MQM’s original charter of demands as reported
in Kennedy (1991).
11. National  Highway  Authority’s  official  website:  http://www.nha.gov.pk/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=173:lyari-expressway-project-
&catid=48:development&Itemid=73 (accessed on 14 October 2011).
12. The  project  compensated  30,000  displaced  home-owners  according  to  the  official
rehabilitation  agency  (http://lerpkarachi.com.pk/pages/project-facts.php accessed  30  May
2011).  The  Urban  Resource  Centre  claims  that  77,000  families  were  displaced.  In  the  style
reminiscent of the 1960s resettlement of Partition migrants, many LEW affected people remained
uncompensated, while compensation was offered in the form of plots of land at great distances
from the city centre and places of work (Hasan 2005).
13. Authors’ calculations are based on polling station level data from the Election Commission of
Pakistan.
ABSTRACTS
Around  half  of  Karachi’s  population  resides  in  localities  that  started  life  as  unplanned
settlements, which acquired different levels of security from eviction. This paper examines the
relationship between demand-making by unplanned settlements and urban political process. It
interprets  the  gradual  transformation  of  a  cluster  originally  on  the  geographic  and  social
periphery of the city into a regularised colony through the lens of collective action. The diverse
roles of migration, mobilisation, and collective identity which we find in individual stories and
community  histories,  capture  a  range  of  processes  and  experiences  within  Karachi’s  wide
margin. The politics of regularisation thus offers a critical perspective on the dynamics of urban
democracy.
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